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COMMENTS

The Evolving Doctrine of Implication: The
Export Administration Act and Private
Rights of Action
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two recent United States District Court opinions examine the question of when a federal court may invoke the "implication" doctrine
which permits them "to create a private right of action from a federal
statute that does not expressly provide for [a] private remed[y]. . .. "'
Both of the cases raise the issue of implication as it applies to the antiboycott provision of the Export Administration Act (EAA).2 Plaintiffs
in both Bulk Oil (Zug) A. G. v. Sun Co., andAbrams v. Baylor College of
Medicine,4 claimed an implied private right to bring an action for damages and in addition, alleged substantive violations of the statute's antiboycott provisions. In Abrams v. Baylor College, the court ruled that
the EAA did create an implied private right of action.5 This conclusion
seemed to contradict the Bulk Oil decision handed down seven months
earlier which held that no private remedy exists under the statute.6
This Note attempts to provide some guidelines for courts in determining whether a federal statute contains an implied private right of action, using the EAA as an example. Part I provides an overview of the
statute's legislative history and its main provisions. 7 In Part II, the Note
I Note, Implication of PrivateActions from FederalStatutes: from Borak to Ash, 1 J. CORP. L.
371, 371 (1976).
2 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1982).
3 583 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
4 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
5 Id. at 1581.
6 583 F. Supp. at 1138.
7 See text accompanying notes 11-56.
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examines the analysis used by the courts in Bulk Oil and Abrams in determining whether a private right of action is implied under the EAA.8
Parts III and IV put these cases in perspective by providing a brief history of the doctrine of implication, and go on to apply this implication
analysis to the two principle cases.9 Finally, to assure proper application
of the implication doctrine to particular statutes, this Note concludes
that courts should recognize that in the absence of clear and substantial
evidence that the legislature intended to create or deny private actions,
the most compelling consideration must be whether the implication of
such rights is consistent with and necessary to the purposes for which the
statute was enacted.10 This consideration avoids the artificial exercise of
constructing legislative intent out of a silent or incomplete record, and
focuses instead on an analysis of the kind of remedies that are needed to
give the statute its intended effect.
II.

THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT

The Export Administration Act is aimed at restricting exports that
are determined to be detrimental to United States national security or
foreign policy.11 The EAA sets out the types of goods and the varying
situations in which United States exports are subject to governmental
control.1 2 Five general substantive areas are included within the Act.
Section 2403-1 addresses the export of technology and goods developed
by the United States Department of Defense.1 3 Section 2404 gives the
President the right to restrict or prohibit the export of specified goods.
The President may also restrict or prohibit exports of such goods to specified countries following a determination that such trade would significantly enhance the military strength of a nation which would prove
harmful to the national security of the United States.' 4 Section 2405 enables the Executive to curtail exports to the extent necessary to significantly further United States foreign policy or to meet international
obligations.'" In addition, controls may be imposed on the export of
goods which are in short supply under section 2406.16 Finally, section
2407 contains the provisions in controversy here which relate to foreign
8 See text accompanying notes 57-97.
9 See text accompanying notes 98-187.
10 See text accompanying notes 188-252.
I1 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401(5),(8) (1982).

12
13
14
15
16

Id. §§ 2401-2420.
Id. § 2403-1.
Id. § 2402(2)(A).
Id. § 2405(a)(1).
Id. § 2406.
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boycotts. 17
Section 2407 prohibits any United States person from refusing to do
business with any country friendly to the United States which is the subject of a foreign boycott, or from complying with a foreign boycott by
refusing to do business with a nation friendly to the United States, or by
discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, religion or national origin.I8 These antiboycott provisions explicitly preempt state law
on this subject. 19 Furthermore, they state that "[n]othing in this subsection may be construed to supersede or limit the operation of the antitrust
'20
or civil rights laws of the United States."
The remedies available in the event of a violation do not appear as
part of the antiboycott provisions themselves, but instead are contained
in a separate section of the statute. 2 ' The statute specifies three types of
penalties for violation of the Act: 1) fines may be levied by the Department of Commerce; 2) the offender may be imprisoned; or 3) other administrative sanctions may be imposed, including the revocation of
export licenses. 22 Subsection (g) of the violations provision further clarifies that "[n]othing in subsection (c),(d), or (f) limits-. . . the availability
of other administrative or judicial remedies with respect to violations of
this Act ....

23

17 Id. § 2407. Section 2407 seeks to implement the stated congressional policy:
(A) to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries
against other countries friendly to the United States or against any United States person;
(B) to encourage and, in specified cases, require United States persons engaged in the export of
goods ... to refuse to take actions. . . which have the effect of furthering or supporting the
restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any foreign country against a
country friendly to the United States or against any United States person ....
Id. § 2402(5)(A)-(B).
18 The substantive portions of the antiboycott provisions at issue in Abrams and Bulk Oil prohibit any United States person from taking any action:
with intent to comply with, further, or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign
country against a country which is friendly to the United States and which is not itself the
object of any form of boycott pursuant to United States law or regulation:
(A) Refusing, or requiring any other person to refuse, to do business with or in the boycotted
country, with any business concern organized under the laws of the boycotted country, with any
national or resident of the boycotted country, or with any other person, pursuant to an agreement with, a requirement of, or a request from or on behalf of the boycotting country ....
(B) Refusing, or requiring any other person to refuse, to employ or otherwise discriminating
against any United States person on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin of that
person or of any owner, officer, director, or employee of such person.
Id. § 2407(a)(1), (a)(l)(A), (a)(1)(B).
19 Id. § 2407(c).
20 Id. § 2407(a)(4).
21 Id. § 2410.
22 Id. § 2410(a)-(c).
23 Id. § 2410(g). Sections 2410(c), (d), and (f) were added in 1965 and specifically describe civil
penalties and administrative sanctions. Subsection (g) clarifies that this list is not exhaustive.
although just what other remedies are available remains unclear.
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A. History of the Export Administration Act
Much of the present text of the Export Administration Act was first
enacted in 1949 as the Export Control Act. 4 Originally intended to control the export of scarce goods and goods with potential military importance, the Act's sanctions were limited to fines and/or imprisonment.2 5
Although at this point the statute included the beginning stages of the
present violations provisions, the antiboycott portions of the Act did not
yet exist. In the debates prior to passage of the law in 1949 there was no
discussion of a right to private action in either house of Congress. 6
Amendments in 1965 changed the title to the Export Administration Act, and added the first expression of the antiboycott policy to the
statute. The EAA included a policy statement that the United States
would oppose restrictive trade practices and boycotts imposed by foreign
countries against nations friendly to the United States.2 7 The purpose of
this addition was to "furnish the administration with clear legal authority to protect American business firms from competitive pressures to become involved in foreign trade conspiracies against countries friendly to
the United States." 2 The effectiveness of this policy was wholly dependent upon the initiative of the executive branch to assure compliance
with its directives since there was no statutorily imposed sanction for
violations. The 1965 Amendments also added civil penalties to the existing penal sanction of the original Act.2 9 In addition, Congress clarified
that "the availability of other administrative or judicial remedies with
respect to violations of this Act ...
is not limited to the particular
sanctions spelled out in the preceding sections.
After its passage in 1965, the antiboycott policy "languished in the
bureaucracy" due to failure of the executive branch actively to imple24 Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949).
25 Id. at 8.

26 See S. REP. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprintedin 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 1094; H.R. REP. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
27 Export Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 3, 79 Stat. 209, 209-10 (1965). The text of
this added section read:
The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States (A) to oppose restrictive
trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries
friendly to the United States and (B) to encourage and request domestic concerns engaged in the
export of articles, materials, supplies, or information, to refuse to take any action, including the
furnishing of information or the signing of agreements, which has the effect of furthering or

supporting the restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any foreign country
against another country friendly to the United States.
28 S. REP. No. 363, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1826, 1826.
29 Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 2, 79 Stat. 209, 209 (1965).
30 Id.
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ment the policy. 1 According to a Senate report, "as late as the summer
of 1975, Commerce Department report forms volunteered the advice that
'U.S. firms are not legally prohibited from taking any action, including
the furnishing of information or the signing of agreements, that has the
effect of furthering or supporting such restrictive trade practices or boycotts.' ,32 While this was a literal reading of the law, it displays a lax
administrative attitude toward enforcement of the policy.
In addition to minimal enforcement of the antiboycott policy, the
increasing impact of the Arab boycott of Israel on the United States during the 1970s was another factor contributing to congressional attention
on this matter.3 Arab countries began to buy more goods imported
from the United States with their newly acquired oil revenues, and as
sales to the Arab world increased so did the force of the Arab demands
on American business. 4 Reports filed with the Department of Commerce show a drastic increase in the number of Arab boycott demands,
which rose from 785 in the full year 1974 to 72,781 during a six-month
period in 1976.11 During the same period in 1976, "U.S. firms indicated
that they intended to comply with Arab boycott demands in over 90 per'3 6
cent of their export transactions.
As a result of increasing Arab pressures and frustration with the
lack of administrative enforcement, further amendments were proposed
in 1976 that replaced the discretionary antiboycott policy with a clear
prohibition of this activity. The House of Representatives approved a
bill allowing recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees in a private
action for violation of the statute, including the antiboycott sections.
The Senate bill did not contain such a provision, however, and Congress
adjourned without voting on either measure. 8 In the next session of
Congress, neither bill was brought up again. Instead, a new bill was
passed by both houses which empowered the administrative agency to
revoke export licenses for violations, but omitted the provisions calling
for treble damages in private actions. 9
This 1977 version of the EAA put some teeth into the antiboycott
31
32
33
of the
34
35

123 CONG. REC. 11,424 (1977) (statement of Mr. Fascell).
S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977).
See Arab Boycott: Hearings on S. 69 and S. 92 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
123 CONG. REc. 11,424 (1977) (statement of Mr. Fascell).
S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977).

36 Id.

37 H.R. 15377, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. Ri c. 31,952 (1976).
38 See S. 3084, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
39 Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977). The
antiboycott portions were reenacted and incorporated into the 1979 version of the EAA. Export
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policy of the prior law. The new amendment prohibited compliance with
foreign boycotts on nations friendly to the United States, where the 1965
law had simply declared it a United States policy to oppose such compliance.' The President was given the authority to issue regulations implementing the Act4 1 which expressly preempted all state foreign boycott
laws.4 2 In addition, the amendments provided that nothing in the above
antiboycott sections "may be construed to supersede or limit the operation of the antitrust or civil rights laws of the United States."4 3
Discussion in the House and Senate, as well as resulting reports, are
On a
quite illuminating as to the motivation behind these changes.'
general level, the Senate explicitly balanced two competing interests in
formulating the bill. On one side was the Senate committee's belief that
the United States "should not acquiesce in attempts by foreign governments to use secondary and tertiary boycotts to embroil American citizens in their battles against others by forcing them to participate in
actions which are repugnant to American values and traditions."4 5 The
discriminatory effects against American Jews were described as the most
offensive aspect of the Arab boycott demands.4 6
On the other side, however, the committee acknowledged the "political sensitivities of the Arab States themselves," '4 7 and sought "to defend

American principles without unnecessarily interfering with the rights of
others and without creating conditions which undermine U.S. influence
or a settlement in the Middle East."4 8 The report further recognized
Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 8, 93 Stat. 503, 521-524 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2407 (1982)).
40 Compare Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 201(a), 91 Stat.
235, 244-246 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1982)) with Export Control Act of 1949,
Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 3(a), 79 Stat. 209, 209-210 (1965).
41 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1).
42 Id. § 2407(c).
43 Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 205, 91 Stat. 235, 248
(current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (1982)). Changes were also made in the separate violations and enforcement portions of the Act. Administrative penalties for violations of the statute
were increased from $1,000 to $10,000, id. § 112(c), 91 Stat. 235, 240 (current version at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2410(c)(1) (1982)), and Congress clarified "that existing law authorizes the suspension of
export privileges for violations of the antiboycott provisions of the act as well as any other provisions
of the act." S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). These additions plus several others
including the procedural requirement of notice and hearing before imposition of an administrative
sanction, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(2)(B) (1982), were incorporated without change into the EAA in
1979. See H.R. REP. No. 200, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1979); Export Administration Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 8, 93 Stat. 503, 521-524 (1979).
44 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
45 Id. at 21.
46 122 CONG;. Rrc. 31,930 (1976) (statement of Mr. Burke).
47 S. Ri.p. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977).
48 Id.
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"the difficulty of enforcing prohibitions on refusals to deal. . . . The
danger of unwarranted allegations in this highly sensitive area has
prompted the committee to leave enforcement in the hands of the Executive branch instead of creating a private right of action."4 9 In all of the
legislative history of the EAA, this is the only statement which directly
addresses the issue of the existence of private rights of action under the
statute.
The 1979 EAA expired on March 30, 1984.50 In order to give Congress time either to approve a new export statute or reauthorize the 1979
EAA, President Reagan extended the effective date of the statute for an
additional year until March 30, 1985.51 Congress failed to take any action on the matter before the extension lapsed,5 2 so the President extended his Executive Order which continued the EAA in effect beyond
the Order's originally stated expiration date. 3 It was not until July 12,
1985 that Congress approved amendments to the EAA. 4 Aside from a
few minor changes, the 1985 Amendments essentially reauthorized the
provisions of the 1979 EAA, including the antiboycott section and the
applicable portions of the enforcement section. 5 As a result, the statutory language of the newly enacted EAA, remains ambiguous as to the
existence of a private right of action. In addition, the subject was not
discussed in either house of Congress during their consideration of the
amendment. 6

III. THE CASES
Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine and Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v.
Sun Co. both confronted the courts with the question of whether private
rights of action were available under the EAA. Despite the fact that
Bulk Oil involved allegations of a refusal to deal and that Abrams dealt
with alleged employment discrimination, the issue in both cases was the
same. Both were actions allegedly taken in compliance with foreign boycotts and both types of action were allegedly prohibited by the antiboycott provisions of the EAA.
49 Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
50 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2419 (1981).
51 Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984).
52 Congress Clears Bill to Renew Main Law Regulating Exports, 43 CONG. Q. 1302 (1985).
53 Exec. Notice of March 28, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 12,513 (1985).
54 Export Administration Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985). These
amendments authorize the statute to remain in effect until September 30, 1989. Id.
55 Id.
56 See 131 CONG. Riic. 1991, 3995, 5059 (1985).
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A.

Bulk Oil v. Sun

The facts on which the New York court denied Bulk Oil a private
right of action are as follows. Bulk Oil and Sun were parties in a longterm oil contract whereby Sun agreed to deliver specified amounts of
North Sea crude oil to Bulk Oil in thirteen shipments.5 7 The destination
clause in the contract stipulated that the "destination [is] free but always
in line with [the] exporting country's Government policy." 5 8 In this
transaction the exporting country was the United Kingdom which had a
policy which restricted the export of North Sea oil only to specified countries, of which Israel was not one.59 Bulk Oil designated Haifa, Israel as
the site of Sun's first delivery, whereupon Sun refused to make the
delivery.6"
Sun then instituted an arbitration proceeding for damages incurred
as a result of what it believed to be a breach of contract by Bulk Oil.6 1
The Arbitrator rejected Bulk Oil's defenses,6" finding a violation of the
United Kingdom's governmental policy and a resulting breach of contract when Bulk Oil selected Haifa, Israel as the place of delivery.6 3 Bulk
Oil then brought this suit on several grounds, including section
2407(a)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act."4
The threshold issue with regard to the EAA claims was whether
Bulk Oil could bring a private suit under the statute.6 5 All of the remedies expressly created under the statute must be initiated by the government, 66 and, as noted earlier, there is no explicit language in the statute
which provides for a private right of action. In this suit, Bulk Oil was
seeking to assert its own right to sue without having to convince the
57 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1137.
58 Id. at 1136.
59 Id. at 1138. The policy of the United Kingdom restricted the sale of North Sea crude oil to
those countries who were members of the International Energy Agency or of the European Economic Community. Exports were also permitted to nations who had an existing pattern of trade in
the oil. Israel did not fall into any of these categories. Id.
60 Id. at 1136.
61 Complaint for Plaintiff at 38, Bulk Oil v. Sun Co., 583 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
62 Bulk Oil defended on the grounds that United Kingdom policy in fact did allow the export of
North Sea oil to Israel and that if it did not, the prohibition was illegal. In addition, Bulk Oil
claimed that it had mistakenly been led to believe that an Israeli designation would be permissible,
and due to the doctrine of estoppel, Sun no longer could enforce the destination clause of the contract. Arbitrator's Interim Award at
40-60, 127-40.
63 583 F. Supp. at 1136.
64 Bulk Oil also alleged violations of the antitrust laws, section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982), and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1982). In addition, Bulk Oil filed a claim of wrongful attachment. 583 F. Supp. at

1136.
65 583 F. Supp. at 1138.
66 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1982).
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Commerce Department to pursue its claim. When private rights of action are not mentioned in the language of the statute itself, courts have
established a doctrine of "implication" which permits a judge to read
such a right into a statute in certain situations.6 7
68
Initially, the court cited the four factors identified in Cort v. Ash
which are to be considered in deciding when a private right of action may
be implied:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted,'-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
it would
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
69
law?
After setting out this multi-faceted test, however, the court interpreted
the post-Cort cases as having collapsed the four-pronged test into the
single inquiry of congressional intent.7 More precisely, the inquiry focuses on Congress' understanding of the law it intended to restructure. 7
Having concluded that the legislative intent is of foremost importance in determining implied rights of action, the court in Bulk Oil embarked on a detailed examination of the legislative history of the EAA
from the time of its original passage in 1949 to the addition of the antiboycott provisions in 1979.72 Two aspects of the legislative process
struck the New York court as "significant [to the question of private
rights] in the mass of otherwise unenlightening legislative history.... " 73
First, the claim of a private right of action under the EAA had never
been raised prior to this suit. As a result, no private action had ever been
recognized under the EAA.74 Second, the court considered Congress'
failure to approve the 1976 bill providing for treble damages and attor67 As Justice Stevens stated:
When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory
rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights. But the
Court has long recognized that under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to
do so is not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to the
persons benefited by its legislation.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
68 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
69 Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
70 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1139.
71 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982).
72 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1139-40.
73 Id. at 1140.

74 Id.
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ney's fees as indicative of its intent not to create such an action.75 The
court concluded that the legislative history revealed "a keen desire on the
part of Congress to spell out precisely those powers granted by the
amendments, and a reluctance to leave important matters to 'implication.' "76 Noting that several rights of lesser importance to the statutory
scheme than a private right of action were explicitly provided for because
they were "too important... to be left to implication," the court further
concluded that if Congress had meant to create such a right it would
have expressly stated so.7 7

The court went on to apply the rule of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius to the statute.7 8 This maxim dictates that
explicit congressional provision for enforcement through civil and criminal penalties as well as administrative sanctions, proves that the omission
of a private action provision was intentional and therefore precludes judicial implication of such an action.79 Based on these considerations, the
court denied Bulk Oil the right to bring a private suit under the EAA.
B. Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine
In contrast to Bulk Oil, the court in Abrams v. Baylor College of
Medicine concluded that the EAA does provide a private right of action.8" The plaintiffs, Lawrence Abrams and Stuart Linde, were anesthesiologists employed by defendant Baylor College of Medicine. Abrams
alleged that Baylor discriminated against Jews in its hiring for a special
rotation program to Saudi Arabia."1 Baylor participated in a program
whereby cardiovascular surgical teams from the medical school were sent
to work in the nationally owned King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to the terms of the agreement, the Saudis
provided the funding for the exchange which sent its first team of Baylor
doctors to Saudi Arabia in 1978.82 The plaintiff doctors brought suit
75 Id. at 1140-41.

76 Id. at 1142.
77 Id. at 1142-43. S. REP. No. 363, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprintedin 1965 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEvs 1826, 1831.
78 583 F. Supp. at 1142. According to this maxim, if a statute specifies the effects of a particular
provision, effects other than those listed are excluded. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed.

1979).
79
80
81
82

Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1142.
Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1570.
Id.
Each surgical team included two anesthesiologists, one senior and one assistant, among its

doctors and staff. Doctors selected for the program traveled to Saudi Arabia and remained there for
a minimurhi of three consecutive months. As a result, participants were required to obtain visas for

entrance and exit of the country from the Saudi government. Id. at 1573.
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claiming that Baylor had wrongfully discriminated against Jewish doctors in its selection of candidates for inclusion in the program in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.83 In addition, they alleged
that Baylor had discriminated in furtherance of the Saudi boycott of
Israel in contravention of the Export Administration Act.84 The doctors
stated that upon learning of the program they each approached the medical school administration expressing their interest in participating in the
exchange. Both were informed that since they were Jewish they were
considered ineligible for the program.85
Although the suit was decided on Title VII grounds,8 6 the Texas
court went on to address the EAA claim, stating that an application of
the Cort factors to the circumstances of the suit "weigh[ed] heavily in
favor of implying a private cause of action under the EAA for Jewish
persons who have been injured by acts made illegal by the EAA."87 The
court predictably turned first to the legislative history of the statute, citing Bulk Oil as correctly relying most heavily on congressional intent.88
However, whereas the New York court in Bulk Oil determined that the
nonpassage of the 1976 House bill providing for treble damages and attorney's fees for victims of EAA violations was a clear indication of an
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
84 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(B).
85 Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1575-76.
86 The Texas court first analyzed the Title VII claim, determining that the plaintiffs had established a primafacie case of discrimination. The evidence supporting the prima facie case was that
"(1) they sought positions in the King Faisal program; (2) they were fully qualified to participate in
the program; (3) their requests to participate in the program were denied because they are Jews; and
(4) that following these denials, Baylor persisted in designating non-Jewish participants." Id. at
1579.
Baylor's reasons for barring Jews from the program did not rest on either a legitimate business
necessity or a bona fide occupational qualification, therefore the court held Baylor in violation of
Title VII. There is no evidence that Saudi Arabia actually required Jews to be excluded from participating in the exchange program. Nor did Baylor ever have "any express agreement or understanding with the Saudis to th[is] effect." Id. at 1575. In fact, both the University of Colorado Medical
College and University of Washington Medical School successfully insisted that nondiscrimination
clauses be included in their agreements to set up similar programs. Id. at 1576.
The court awarded the doctors $156,840 and $248,982 each in compensatory damages for lost
pay and benefits under the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 1577-78. The Saudi Arabian rotation was an
attractive opportunity for doctors at Baylor for several reasons. First, the salaries paid the visiting
Americans were intended to compensate at levels that created an incentive for participation in the
program. As a result, the salary levels were at least twice as high as those of the doctors who
remained in the domestic Baylor affiliated hospital. Second, greater clinical experience could be
gained through this rotation than was typically available in the United States. This is so because the
Saudi hospital dealt with a greater variety of ailments than were found in most U.S. hospitals. Id. at
1573.
87 Id. at 1581.
88 Id. at 1580.
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intent not to create private rights under the statute, the court in Abrams
did not find this factor dispositive for several reasons:
First, the 1976 provision provided for treble damages rather than actual
damages. Second, the 94th Congress, which expired in 1976, never expressly rejected the 1976 House bill but rather simply adjourned without
taking final action on that bill. Third, the bills that directly led to the 1977
act never contained any language 89
which would have either "created" or
"denied" a private cause of action.

Finding that the legislative history was not determinative of the
question, the court considered the remaining three Cort factors. 9° According to the court's interpretation, the purpose of the antiboycott sections of the EAA was to counteract "efforts by Arab countries to
pressure American companies into furthering their boycotts of Israeli interests." 91 Reading the language of the EAA and its regulations 92 in
light of this goal, this court concluded "that the 'especial' class of persons
to be protected by the EAA is comprised not only of Israelis but of
American Jews as well." 93 Finally, the court summarily concluded that
the type of right created by an implied private action under the EAA was
not traditionally governed by state law. 94 In this case the Abrams court
applied the Cort factors to the EAA, and found that a private cause of
action existed under the antiboycott provisions of the statute. 95
89 Id. at 1580-81.
90 Id. at 1581. These three factors are: 1) the purposes of the statute; 2) the statute's intended
beneficiaries; and 3) the existence of governing state law.
91 Id.
92 Exec. Order No. 12,214, 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.1-369.8 (1980), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407
(1982).
93 Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1581.
94 Id.
95 Id. Having determined that plaintiffs may bring a private action, the court then concluded
that Baylor violated the substantive prohibitions of the EAA. To a great extent, the court was
convinced by the close similarity between the following example of conduct which violates the EAA
contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, and the facts of the case before them. 15 C.F.R.
§ 369.2(b) states:
The following examples are intended to give guidance in determining the circumstances in
which the taking of particular discriminatory actions is prohibited....
(1) U.S. construction company A is awarded a contract to build an office complex in
boycotting country Y. A believing that employees of a particular religion will not be permitted
to work in Y because of Y's boycott against country X, excluded U.S. persons of that religion
from consideration for employment on the project.
A's refusal to consider qualified U.S. persons of a particular religion for work on the project in Y constitutes a prohibited boycott-based discriminatory action against U.S. persons on
the basis of religion.
Based on this example, the underlying policies of the EAA, and a finding of the necessary intent, the
court found Baylor to have violated the EAA. 581 F. Supp. at 1582.
The portion of the opinion which addressed the EAA with regard to both the implied action
and substantive violations was dicta. The case was decided on Title VII grounds and it is under that
statute that the plaintiffs' awards were given. Id. at 1579-80, 1582. After stating that the type of
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Both the Texas court in Abrams and the New York court in Bulk

Oil used the same method of analyzing whether a private cause of action
may be judicially implied under the antiboycott provisions of the EAA.
In both, the four part test of Cort v. Ash was cited as the criteria to be
followed, yet the factor of legislative intent was viewed as the central
issue.9 6 Similarly, both courts relied entirely upon the statute's legislative history in discerning that intent and uncovered virtually the same
data in congressional records on the subject.97 Yet the two courts
reached inconsistent conclusions; the court in Abrams granted a private
right of recovery and the court in Bulk Oil denied a similar right under
the same statute. This inconsistency stems in large part from the inadequate analytical approach used by both courts. Before exploring the
shortcomings of their approach in detail and suggesting an alternative
method of analysis, it is first necessary to examine a short history of the
implication doctrine, as well as the present state of its evolution.
IV.

IMPLICATION DOCTRINE

The four part test set out in Cort v. Ash9 8 for the implication of
private rights represented a change in judicial attitudes toward implication. It reflected the first step in a shift away from an activist bench that
was inclined to assert its independent judgement when evaluating the implication of private rights, toward a more deferential court that has
shown a greater reluctance to find such a right without a clear mandate
from Congress. 99 In the earliest stages of the development of this doctrine, private rights were implied when the plaintiff was a member of the
class which the statute was intended to benefit." ° ° A showing that the
statute operated to protect a specific class of people, rather than the public at large, was sufficient to satisfy the requirement.101 This broad standiscriminatory harm suffered by the plaintiffs entitled them to compensatory, though not punitive,
damages "the Court conclude[d] that these losses [would] be fully compensated by the awards...
granted ... as part of [the] Title VII remedies. To duplicate recovery... here would be an unjust
windfall to the Plaintiffs." Id. at 1582.
96 Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1580; Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1139.
97 Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1580-81; Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1139-40.
98 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. For the language of the four part test see text accompanying note 69.
99 Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981).
100 See Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). This case involved an action for
damages by a railroad employee who was injured in a switching accident. His suit was upheld
despite the absence of express language in the Federal Safety Appliance Acts. 27 Stat. 531 (1893)
amended by 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970). "A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act,
and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover damages from the party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the
common law ..
" 241 U.S. at 39.
101 Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39. Rigsby is generally viewed as the first case to establish the doctrine of
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dard was reinforced in J.. Case Co. v. Borak, °2 where a corporate
shareholder challenging a merger alleged to have resulted from false and
misleading proxy statements was held to have a private right of action
under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. To imply a private right of
action it was sufficient for the Court to find that protection of investors
was "among [the] chief purposes" of the statute.103
The lenient standard used in Borak rests in part on the conception
that federal courts have inherent power to imply private rights for statutory violations.104 According to this theory, the proper role of the court
is to engage in "a process whereby [it] exercises a choice among traditionally available judicial remedies according to reasons related to the
substantive social policy embodied in an act of positive law." 10 5 This
gives the courts license to create private rights on their own unless Congress has clearly indicated an intent to the contrary.
Beginning with Cort, however, this activist conception of the judicial
role was replaced with a more restrictive view.10 6 In Cort the Supreme
Court rejected such an expansive reading of the intended beneficiary requirement. The Court determined that the plaintiff fell outside the class
of intended beneficiaries even though he had a financial interest in the
dispute and "was at least an incidental beneficiary of the legislation in the
sense that misuse of shareholder's funds was a side concern of Congress
in enacting the ... law."10 7 In addition, the Court expressly added the
issue of legislative intent to the consideration of when to imply private
actions. 108 Cort represents the first indication of what was to become an
increasing emphasis on a traditional separation of powers rationale in
defining the judicial role as predominantly one of discerning legislative
intent, rather than a more independent application of equity as perceived
from the bench.
By 1979, the most recent Supreme Court decisions suggested that
the Court was relying on a different theory to justify judicial implicajudicially implied private rights of action. See Note, Implied PrivateRights of Action-the Cort v.
Ash Test-Interaction of "Especial Beneficiary" and Legislative Intent, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1173
(1978); Note, supranote 1, at 373. Prior to Rigsby, the implication doctrine had existed at common
law in England since 1854. Couch v. Steel, 118 ENG. REP. 1193, 1196-97 (Q.B. 1854).
102 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
103 Id. at 432.
104 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 99.
105 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 402 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
106 See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Investors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 442 U.S. 677 (1978); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
107 Comment, PrivateRights of Action Under Title IX, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Riv. 425 (1978).
108 Cort, 422 U.S. 66.
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tion.' 0 9 In these cases, the implication of private actions had become
simply a "question of statutory construction."' 110 This approach places
greater limitations on the role of the judiciary in fashioning remedies
than the inherent rights rationale had imposed, and the change represented a movement away from anything resembling outright judicial legislation."1 ' According to this new conception, a court may imply a
private remedy only insofar as it can find evidence that Congress intended such a right to exist. 1 12 As a result, congressional intent, the second factor in the traditional Cort test," 3 has become the main focus of
judicial inquiry in cases of implied private actions." 4 Three years after
Cort, the Supreme Court, in the case of Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington," 5 explained that while:
[i]t is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it considered "relevant" in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing for one[,] ... the Court did not decide that
each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in
Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its
purpose 6...
1

are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative

intent.
In fact, these are the "criteria through which this intent [can] be discerned." I 7 The role of the courts is thus to determine congressional intent, not to engage in activist leadership to "improve upon the statutory
scheme that Congress enacted into law.""' 8
Not only did this increased reliance on legislative intent reduce the
importance of the other parts of the Cort analysis, but it changed the
Court's view of the content of the remaining factors as well. Whereas
earlier cases merely instructed courts to examine the nature of the rights
protected by the statute to determine whether the plaintiff was an in109 See, e.g., Transamerica,444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1978); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1978). See also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v.
Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984), and California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), which seem to reflect
the same theoretical basis.
110 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688.
111 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.

112 Frankel, supra note 99, at 557.
113 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.

114 See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293; Transamerica,444 U.S. at 23-24 (White, J., dissenting).

115 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 560.
116 Id. at 575-76.
117 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979).
118 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578.
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tended beneficiary, 1 9 more recent cases indicate that in addition the language of the statute itself must also "expressly identif[y] the class
Congress intended to benefit....
The Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago' distinguished between statutes which use the language of rights and those
which speak in terms of duties. The latter are generally "enacted for the
protection of the general public" and do not permit the implication of
private rights, while the former are intended to focus on a particular
group of individuals and may include an implied private right of action. 2 2 In Cannon, the plaintiff was allegedly rejected from the medical
program at the University of Chicago because she was a woman, in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The Court found
that the operative statutory language clearly conferred benefits on those
individuals subjected to gender discrimination," 3 and that the plaintiff
was within the class to be benefited. Since the stringent requirement for
establishing a statutory beneficiary was satisfied, the Court held that a
private right existed under the statute."2 4 If Congress had drafted the
statute "simply as a ban on discriminatory conduct" rather than with an
"unmistakable focus on the benefited class ... there would be far less
reason to infer a private remedy in favor of an individual person."' 2 5 In
addition, "because the right to be free of discrimination is a 'personal'
one, a statute conferring such a [civil] right will almost have to be
phrased in terms of the persons benefited."' 2 6 At a minimum, "the stat12 7
ute in question [must] at least prohibit certain conduct."'
If a court finds that the statute in question does not grant private
rights to an identifiable class of persons and that the legislative history
does not suggest an intent to create a private remedy, the failure to meet
119 See Borak, 377 U.S. 426; Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). See also text
accompanying notes 100-103.
120 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690. See id. at 690 n.13 (drawing a distinction between constitutional
and other rights in the implication of private actions).
121 Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
122 Id. at 689-90. See id. at 690 n.13 for a discussion of the cases upholding this distinction as
well as the exceptions.
123 The key language in the statute was as follows: "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (1972).
124 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693-94.
125 Id. at 690-91. See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294.
126 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 692 n.13.

127 Touche Ro., 442 U.S. at 569. But see Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294 (no private right since "the
statute states no more than a general proscription of certain activities").
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these first two Cort factors is definitive and the judicial inquiry ends. 2 8
The court need not "trudge through all four of the factors when the dispositive question of legislative intent has been resolved."' 2 9 Thus, the
elements of statutory purpose and the traditional applicability of state as
opposed to federal law are frequently not considered in "implication"
decisions.130 Consequently, the specific guidelines for conducting an inquiry into the element of statutory purpose are less defined than the
guidelines used to determine legislative intent, which through frequent
use has taken on somewhat clearer dimensions.
Cannon provides some insight into the type of considerations involved in evaluating statutory purpose in the context of the implication
of private rights of action. The Court analyzed statutory purpose from
two perspectives, the statute's substantive goals, and its enforcement
objectives."' In Cannon, the substantive goal was to end federal funding
to educational institutions which discriminated on the basis of sex, and
the enforcement goal was to provide individuals with effective protection
against such discrimination.' 3 2 The Court searched the documented legislative history for evidence of legislative intent regarding the narrow
question of the availability of private rights under the statute, as well as
for evidence of the more broad issue of legislative intent regarding the
purposes of the act.' 33 Such an approach often leads courts to lump the
two issues together in their analysis of legislative history, the narrow
question of specific intent to create a private right of action subsuming
1 34
that of general statutory purpose.
The final consideration under Cort, the extent to which state rather
than federal law traditionally governed the subject matter at issue, is
often omitted entirely from a court's evaluation of implication. 35 Since
this factor alone is not enough to warrant the implication of private
rights, courts have usually already decided whether or not implication is
1 36
appropriate without addressing this question.
V.

IMPLICATION AND THE

EAA

CASES

Following the trend of recent "implication" cases, the courts in
128 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 576.

129 Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 298. See supra notes 128-29.
131 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 704 n.36. See Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. at 539.
134 See, eg., Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 383-87.
135 See Transamerica,444 U.S. at 23-24; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298.
136 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Bulk Oil and Abrams concentrated on interpreting congressional intent
through the legislative history of the EAA, in an attempt to find congressional authorization for the court to imply the remedy demanded. 137 In
Bulk Oil, no consideration was given to whether the EAA's antiboycott
provisions were clearly aimed at a benefited class or whether the statute
was simply a prohibition on discriminatory conduct. In contrast, the
court in Abrams was convinced by the background and language of the
Act that the antiboycott provisions of the EAA were intended to protect
both Israelis and American Jews. 138 The court drew this conclusion despite the absence of an explicit indication in the language of the statute
itself that this group was to be protected, and despite the fact that under
a Cannon type of analysis the statute appears to fall within the category
of laws which prohibit discriminatory conduct in general.' 3 9
Essentially, the courts in Bulk Oil and in Abrams were in agreement
as to the content of the EAA's legislative history, but they differed in
their reading of what that history meant. Where the Bulk Oil judge
placed great importance on the fact that the 1976 House bill providing
for treble damages in private actions never passed both houses of Congress, the court in Abrams did not view the incident as dispositive of
legislative intent.14" In their view, "non-passage" of the bill did not
"foreclose" a private cause of action because the proposal called for
treble damages instead of actual damages, the bill was never explicitly
rejected as Congress simply adjourned without a final vote, and the bill
became
that was drafted and passed by the following Congress, which
14 1
all.
at
damages
private
of
mention
no
made
the 1977 Act,
Interestingly, neither court cited the only comments directly on
point in the whole body of legislative history. 42 In describing the legislative response to Arab pressures embodied in section 2407 of the proposed
EAA amendments, the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance
acknowledged its "sensitiv[ity] to the difficulty of enforcing prohibitions
137
138
139
140

Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1139; Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1580-81.
Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1581.
See supra text accompanying notes 120-27.
Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1580-81.

141

Id.

142 While the Senate's characterization of the purpose of the 1965 antiboycott policy as providing
the Administration with the authority to protect U.S. companies from boycott pressures arguably

deals specifically with the availability of private remedies, it is unclear what conclusion should be
drawn from the statement. Although the Administration was given authority, the exclusivity of this

authority is not established. In addition, it is possible that even if the power to enforce the antiboycott policy was intended in 1965 to be exclusively administrative, given the government's failure

to use this power effectively, the 1977 amendment may have been intended to eliminate this
exclusivity.
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.The danger of unwarranted allegations in this

highly sensitive area has prompted the committee to leave enforcement in
the hands of the Executive branch instead of creating a private right of
'
action."143
The Committee viewed the continued availability of private
redress under the civil rights and antitrust laws as standing independent
of the exclusively administrative remedial scheme of the Act." 4
Although the House reports do not contain any similar mention of
the exclusivity of administrative remedies,14 5 the Conference Committee
adopted the Senate's version of the provisions for nearly every section of
the antiboycott portion of the statute.146 Given the lack of evidence regarding the House of Representatives' position on this issue, a clear intent by the Senate to exclude private actions, and the adoption of the
Senate version of the amendments, what little evidence can be gathered
from the EAA's legislative history points to the creation of solely administrative remedies.
A literal reading of the statement contained in the Senate report
suggests that this administrative exclusivity may have been intended to
apply only to refusals to deal under section 2407(a)(1)(A). The report
repeatedly refers to that section only, stating that "[tlhe refusal to deal
provisions of the bill.., would neither substitute for nor limit the operation of the antitrust or civil rights laws of the United States." 14 7 Such an
interpretation is not supported by the actual wording and structure of the
EAA provisions themselves, however. The language of section
2407(a)(4) is inclusive: "[n]othing in this subsection" is to affect the operation of civil rights or antitrust laws.' 4 8 Both the ban on refusals to
deal under section 2407(a)(1)(A) and the prohibition on discrimination
in employment under section 2407(a)(1)(B) clearly fall equally within the
meaning of the phrase "this subsection."
The relationship between the antiboycott measures of the EAA and
other pre-existing statutes may provide some help in discerning legislative intent. Just as the Cannon Court, in deciding whether Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 supported a private cause of action,
looked to comparable language in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to see
143 S.Rmb. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977) (emphasis added).
144 Id. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(4) (1982).
145 H.R. R-:ip.
No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
146 H.R. Rim,. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977). Differences between Senate and House
versions in all but the last section were in the language not the substance of the law. The House
version of § 2407(a)(4) mentioned only the antitrust laws while the Senate version, which was
adopted, added the civil rights laws as well. Id.
147 S. Ri,. No.104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977) (emphasis added).
148 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(4) (1982).
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whether that statute had been interpreted to include such remedies," 9 a
comparison between section 2407 of the EAA and other overlapping and
related statutes should be made. Both the Sherman Antitrust Act 150 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641's address the same or similar
problems as do sections 2407(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the EAA respectively.
In fact, Bulk Oil sued on several counts, including both the Sherman
Antitrust Act and section 2407(a)(1)(A) of the EAA. Similarly, in
Abrams, the plaintiff doctors brought suit alleging violations of not only
section 2407(a)(1)(B) of the EAA, but also of Title VII.
The Sherman Act does not adequately deal with the problem of secondary and tertiary boycotts which section 2407 of the EAA is designed
to prevent.'52 According to testimony by the Justice Department, several impediments to its use for this purpose exist, including among them:
1) "the 'distinctive purpose' of the boycott, which exists for political reasons rather than for the purpose of securing commercial advantage;" and
2) "the uncertainty of the economic impact and hence whether it is 'so
certain or severe as to justify application of the per se rule of illegality
Foreign boycotts imposed for political reaapplied domestically.' ""
sons have never been held to constitute a violation of the Sherman
Act. 154
The difficulties in using the Sherman Act to combat the effects of a
boycott are apparent in the Bulk Oil opinion where the defendant's refusal to deliver oil to Israel was held to be neither a "refusal to deal" nor
a boycott.' 55 Furthermore, the court said that even if the defendant's
actions had been a refusal to deal or a boycott, the Act of State doctrine
would bar the court from evaluating the legality of the acts of a sovereign
state inside their own territory. 56 Consequently, even though a private
right of action is conferred by the Sherman Act, the statute's inability to
reach the problems of the secondary and tertiary boycott to which the
149 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677.
150 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
151 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
152 123 CONG. Ri.c. 11,424 (1977) (statement of Mr. Fascell); H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1977); S. RiP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977).
153 S.RitE. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1977), quoting Hearingsbefore the Subcommnnitlee on InternationalFinance on S.425 at 166. Another inadequacy is the doctrine which bars a
sovereign state from being made a defendant in the courts of another sovereign state.
154 S.Rit,. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977).
155 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1136. Even if the failure to deliver was deemed a boycott or refusal
to deal under the antitrust laws, the plaintiffs failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction because
there was no allegation of anticompetitive effects on U.S. commerce. Id. at 1136-37.
156 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1139. See, S. Rit. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977), Bulk
Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1137-38 (addressing the Act of State Doctrine).
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EAA is addressed, suggests that duplication of legislation would not occur if such a right were implied under the EAA.
Title VII bears an even greater resemblence to section 2407(a)(1)(B)
of the EAA than the Sherman Act does to section 2307(a)(1)(A). Both
Title VII and section 2407(a)(1)(B) prohibit discrimination in employ-

ment on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin, in language
that is extremely similar.15 7 Under Title VII, however, a private cause of

action is expressly included in the statute.15 8 If a private right of action
also exists under the EAA, these similarities would result in duplication
of statutory coverage. Any employment discrimination stemming from
foreign boycott pressures would give rise to a private action under Title
VII, nullifying the impact of private rights under section 2407(a)(1)(B) of
the EAA.
A clear example of this problem is provided in Abrams, where plain-

tiffs' suit alleged violations and claimed a private right to recover damages under both statutes. The Texas court found that Baylor violated
both Title VII and the EAA. Since the court found that a private right
existed under the EAA, the plaintiffs were technically entitled to recover
damages under each of the two statutes. To grant recovery under both
statutes would compensate the doctors twice; thus the court limited their
award to recovery under Title VII. I 9 Such an outcome seems to render
superfluous the private right of action provided under the EAA since the
same rights can be vindicated by private individuals under the express
provisions of Title VII. tf °
157 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) states in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
For the comparable section of the EAA, see text accompanying note 18.
158 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
159 Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1582.
160 Although in the securities area, courts have recognized such overlapping provisions, at least
one Supreme Court decision suggests that this is due to the long-standing judicial implication of
private rights which overlap with an express remedy in other sections, and the interpretation of
congressional inaction as a ratification of the Court's decision. Herman & Mac Lean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). In the case of the EAA, however, neither of these circumstances exist.
While implication provides one basis for asserting a private right of action under a federal
statute which does not expressly provide for such a remedy, § 1983 may provide another basis. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. The Supreme Court has held § 1983 to apply to all federal statutes, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
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This problem of duplication would be eliminated if a private right
were available for a violation of any of the sections of the antiboycott
provision, not only for the part dealing with discrimination in employment. In that case, the private remedies provided for in the EAA would
give broader coverage than those included under Title VII. Although
direct overlap would still be present between section 2407(a)(1)(B) of the
EAA and Title VII, the other sections of the EAA would go on to confer
private rights of action in related suits which could not be brought under
Title VII.
There is some indication from the outcome of recent cases that the
Supreme Court may be differentiating between private actions claimed
under civil rights statutes and those alleged under other types of laws. 16 '
Courts appear to imply private rights of action more readily in civil
rights cases than in other areas.' 6 2 The majority opinion in Cannon
makes a somewhat similar distinction when it contrasts "laws enacted for
the protection of the general public" which are not likely to support an
implied private action, with those that confer a right on a benefited class
of individuals which more easily support implication.' 6 3 This differentiation is reminiscent of an earlier distinction set out by the Supreme Court
in Bivens v. Six Unnamed Fed. Narcotics Agents. 16 4 According to that
decision, courts should be reluctant to imply private rights under statutes
which regulate federal economic policy, but "may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done," where legal rights were impinged
upon and a general right to sue is provided by the statute.165 Since section 2407(a)(1)(B) provides civil rights-type protection, it is possible that
it presents a more favorable situation for the implication of private rights
than does section 2407(a)(1)(A) which addresses the more economic subject of refusals to deal.
One possible way to reconcile the outcomes in these two cases is to
admit of a private right of action under subsection (B) of the antiboycott
1, 4-8 (1979), with two exceptions. It does not apply to statutes where "Congress had foreclosed
private enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself," or where the statute in question did not
create enforceable rights under § 1983. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). In Bulk Oil and in Abrams, however, the plaintiffs did not
raise this issue.
161 Note, PrivateRight of Action, California v. Sierra Club, 22 SANTA CLARA L. Ri:v. 949, 95455 & nn. 40-43 (1982).
162 Frankel, supra note 99, at 563 n.59; Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights:
The Casefor a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978). See also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (drawing a distinction between statutes regulating "federal fiscal policy" and those establishing individual

rights in the implication of private rights of action).
163 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-91.
164 403 U.S. 388.
165 Id. at 396. This suit, however, involved constitutional, not statutory rights.
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provision on which the Abrams suit was brought, but to deny one under
subsection (A) on which the Bulk Oil plaintiffs sued. Implication of private rights of action for some parts of a statute but not for other parts has
previously been upheld in the securities field. 166 The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,167 for example, permits implied private rights of action for
individuals harmed by violations of section 14(a) but does not allow the
implication of such rights under section 14(e). 168 The distinction between these two sections of the same statute lies in the differing purposes
for which they were enacted, and the separate and distinct evils which
they were intended to combat. The Supreme Court found that while section 14(a) was designed to protect potential investors for whom a private
right was essential, section 14(e) was not intended to protect the plaintiff
69
tender offeror in a takeover bid.1
A similar case can be made for differentiating between subsection
(A) and subsection (B) of the EAA's antiboycott provision on the
grounds that each was designed to address a different, though related,
problem. Arguably, subsection (A) presents a weaker case for the implication of private rights since the prohibition on refusals to deal has a
lesser effect on third parties than does the ban on boycott-based employment discrimination in subsection (B). Courts have generally been more
willing to imply a cause of action when the statute confers a benefit on a
well-defined group of individuals.'
Under these circumstances, the
third parties are not the United States corporations themselves, but
rather the United States persons who would be harmed by the companies' boycott compliance in the absence of this statute. Thus, it is possible that subsection (A) was intended to effectuate certain foreign policy
goals and therefore to benefit United States citizens in general, while subsection (B) was aimed specifically at protecting United States employees
from boycott-based discrimination.
This distinction does not find support in the text and structure of the
EAA, however, which seems to suggest that whatever explicit or implied
remedies exist, they are available equally to all sections. The fact that all
of the violations and penalty provisions are contained within a separate
section of the statute indicates their applicability to "any provision of this
166 See infra text accompanying note 169.
167 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).

168 See Piper v. Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding no implied private right of action under
§ 14(e) of the 1934 Act); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (holding that such a right exists
under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(holding implied private rights available under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act).
16 Piper, 430 U.S. at 34.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
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Act ....,,t7 These facts suggest that if a private cause of action exists for
any part of the EAA, it must exist for every part of the statute.
The amount of proof courts have required in implication cases has
ranged from a showing of "the most compelling evidence that Congress
intended such an action to exist,"' 17 1 to a rebuttable presumption in favor
of implying a private right of action where explicit remedies were "inadequate to ensure full effectiveness of the statute."' 173 The rigor of the proof
requirement may in many instances affect the outcome of the decision. It
is unclear, however, whether the differences in evidentiary requirements
stem from the nature of the rights involved in each case, or simply reflect
shifting judicial approaches to implication generally.
Any comparison of the EAA and Title VII with regard to private
rights of action must include the violations sections of the two statutes as
well as the substantive provisions. Here, the analogy between the two
statutes becomes more problematic. Title VII expressly provides for private suits, while the EAA does not. It is possible to speculate that had
Congress written the substantive provisions of the EAA to resemble Title
VII, it would have constructed the enforcement provisions similarly as
well. Even though Congress departed from the Title VII model in drafting the violations section of the EAA, inclusion of section 2410(g) may
have been intended to act as a rough equivalent of Title VII. This section
states that the enumerated enforcement actions are not exclusive and that
"the availability of other administrative or judicial remedies" are
74
preserved.1
The plaintiff in Bulk Oil contended that this phrase should be interpreted to confer a private right under the statute. Although the court in
Bulk Oil agreed that such a reading was "literally possible," it held that
this interpretation did not follow consistently from the "history and
structure" of the EAA.' 7 5 The purpose of this part of the statute, according to the court, was to increase the regulatory flexibility of the
scheme by clearly not limiting "the government's choice of sanctions to
enforce the Act."'176 In Abrams, the court did not address this provision
in its opinion even though the plaintiffs discussed the issue in a supplemental memorandum of law to the court. 77 In that memorandum the
171 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1982).
172 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
173 Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. at 202. See also Borak, 377 U.S. at 426.
24 0
174 50 U.S.C. app. §
1 (g) (1982).
175 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1141.
176 Id. at 1142.
177 Plaintifl's Supplemental Memorandum of Law, Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F.
Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
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plaintiffs argued that the purpose of the provision was clearly to permit a
broad range of remedies not explicitly set out in the statute, including the
178
right of private action.
Bulk Oil further emphasized in its discussion of legislative history
and congressional intent, that the plaintiffs' claim for a right of private
action under the EAA was one of first impression. That fact created a
presumption against the existence of such a right. 17 9 In contrast, Abrams
took a more neutral approach to the absence of precedent. 8 ° Abrams
follows a more reasonable approach since it is somewhat illogical to suppose that courts were making an affirmative statement regarding the absence of a private remedy when they are limited to deciding disputes
brought before them, and no suit raising the question under the EAA
had been presented to the bench.
The state of the law prior to the passage of the EAA amendments is
part of the "contemporary legal context" in which the statute must be
interpreted. 18 1 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran instructed that "when the statute by its terms is silent on th[e] issue [of
private rights of action], the initial focus must be on the state of the law
at the time the legislation was enacted ....
[The court] must examine
Congress' perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping."' 82
At the time that the antiboycott provisions were added to the EAA,
no clear pattern of either judicial implication of private rights under the
statute or denial of those rights had been established.' 8 3 As the court in
Bulk Oil pointed out, there was no history of judicial action on the subject at all.' 8 4 This distinguishes the EAA from the Commodities Exchange Act that was interpreted in Merrill Lynch.I" In Merrill Lynch,
the Court discerned a clear pattern of judicial implication of the rights
claimed by the plaintiff, coupled with congressional acquiescence to this
position. 8 6 The state of the law at the time the antiboycott amendments
were added to the EAA, however, was unsettled and unclear. The issue
had never before been the subject of litigation, therefore "Congress was
operating on a tabula rasa. . . "187 Thus, in light of the absence of a
178 Id. at 3.
179 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1140.

180 581 F. Supp. at 1580-81.
181 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-99.
182 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1981).
183 583 F. Supp. at 1141.
184 Id.
185 456 U.S. at 379-82.
186 Id. at 379.
187 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1141 (quoting Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 282, 313 (2d Cir. 1980)
(emphmsis in original)).
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history of either implication or non-implication under the EAA, congressional silence should not be interpreted as acquiescence to existing
practice.
VI.

IMPLYING PRIVATE RIGHTS UNDER THE

EAA

This overview of the recent development of the implication doctrine
suggests that while many aspects of a court's inquiry remain undefined, it
is well settled that the central issue to be determined by a court is
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action under the
statute in question. 88 Courts have relied quite heavily, if not exclusively,
on the statute's legislative history to find evidence of this intent."8 9 In
most instances, extensive reliance on legislative history is misplaced and
perpetuates the "somewhat schizophrenic" posture toward implication of
private rights evidenced by the courts.'
This is particularly so since
"the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny
a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the
question."''
In light of the inconclusive nature of the information available, the reliability of a court finding which rests too heavily on legislative intent drawn from this legislative history is questionable. The
danger in relying on ambiguous information to draw concrete conclusions is that "inconclusive legislative history can be used to support almost any position."' 9 2
The truth of this observation is clearly illustrated by the opposite
readings of the same legislative documents in Abrams and Bulk Oil. The
Bulk Oil decision is an example of how incomplete legislative history can
be misused to create presumptions against implication. In contrast,
Abrams correctly concluded that the legislative history was unclear and
did not foreclose private damage actions. Despite the hazards of relying
on legislative history in implication cases, maintaining necessary limits
on the scope of judicial legislation requires some kind of an inquiry into
congressional intent.' 93 Courts should be careful, however, not to accord
this typically ambiguous evidence too much weight. Only in unusual circumstances, where clear and substantial indications of an intent to create
188 Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293; Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639

(1980).

189 See Abrams, 581 F. Supp. 1570; Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. 1134.
190 Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrack and Ash- Some Implications For Implication, 123 U. PA. L. RFv. 1392, 1412 (1975).
191 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694.
192 Comment, supra note 190, at 1414.
193 At least one commentator has disagreed, calling the search for legislative intent through legislative history "futile" and "irrelevant." Id. at 1413.
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or exclude private suits are found, should such a reading of legislative
intent be determinative.194 Where the evidence is inconclusive, courts
should not invoke expressio unius nor equate congressional silence with
rejection of private rights. 9 5 The absence of explicit provisions for private rights of action and the inclusion of an administrative scheme for
enforcement in a statute can be explained in a variety of ways, only one
of which is that Congress intentionally excluded the availability of private actions under the act in question. Alternatively, Congress may
never have considered the issue, and the outcome, had it in fact done so,
should not be predicted in favor of a rejection of those rights. The court
in Bulk Oil erred when it invoked expressio unius as a post hoe presumption against private rights to bolster its conclusion. 196 In Abrams this
trap was successfully avoided.
This Author's independent review of the legislative history of the
EAA on the issue of implication revealed more evidence on the subject
than either court discovered in their research. The Senate Committee
report, not mentioned in either Bulk Oil or Abrams, clearly rejects private rights of action under the antiboycott provisions of the EAA.' 9 7
While this statement is sufficiently unambiguous, a single indication by
one committee is too incomplete to constitute substantial evidence.' 98 In
total, the majority of the evidence of congressional intent gathered by the
reviewing courts is open to differing interpretations as to its impact on
implication. This Senate report tips the balance away from finding an
intent to create a private right of action, yet because it stands alone as an
isolated indication in a mass of ambiguous evidence, it should not be
determinative.
194 The circumstances in which such a determinative finding can be made from the legislative
history will be quite rare due to the nature of the inquiry itself which is necessary only because the
statute is unclear on its face regarding private rights of action. If Congress had recognized the issue
as an important one and given it due consideration, it is extremely likely that their conclusions
would be embodied in the statute in a clear expression of Congress' position of private rights. Id.
This is not to say that legislative history should be ignored, but just that the instances when its
use will clarify an ambiguous statute will be infrequent. It is possible, for example, that after a
debate on this question, Congress arrived at a decision one way or the other and believed at the time
of passage that its decision was unmistakably incorporated into the language of the statute. In retrospect, while the law may not convey this intent, the legislative history will.
195 Use of the maxim expressio unius and the presumption against implication in the face of congressional silence may appear to be identical. But this is not necessarily correct as expressio utinis
has been used in a variety of different ways, each to a different effect. Id. at 1416-17.
196 583 F. Supp. at 1143.

197 See supra text accompanying notes 49, 143-44.
198 This is a close ease, however, and the Senate report is arguably substantial enough. On balance, the absence of any discussion in the Conference Committee leaves sufficient doubt regarding
the House position on the matter of private rights to justify a finding that this does not meet the
substantiality requirement.
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Unless a court is presented with a rare case of clear legislative intent
on the question of implication, it should go on to consider the third Cort
factor, whether implication is consistent with the purposes of the statute. 199 In determining what the statutory purposes are, a court must
look to a variety of factors which fall generally into two categories: substantive goals and enforcement objectives." ° Under the heading of substantive goals are considerations of the class of persons that the
legislation is intended to protect, the type of harm the law sought to
prevent, and all other collateral considerations which motivated the passage of the statute.2 °1
In the category of enforcement objectives, a court should determine
whether "Congress intentionally limited the available remedies to accomplish a specified purpose," and, if so, private rights should not be implied.2" 2 More precisely, this inquiry involves questions such as:
1) whether there is a particular need for discretionary enforcement of the
statute; 2) if centralized control is necessary to the efficient enforcement
of the act and; 3) if the nature of the regulated activity is such that its
efficacy depends upon consistent, uniform enforcement of the
prohibitions.20 3
The court in Bulk Oil erroneously interpreted congressional inaction
in an undeveloped area of the law, as acquiescence to a history of nonimplication. The court viewed this as clear legislative intent, and treated
it as dispositive. Thus it never considered implication in light of the purposes the EAA was to serve. The court in Abrams on the other hand,
recognized the need for this inquiry but did not adequately take into account all of the purposes behind the EAA. This court found that the
purpose of the antiboycott amendments was to alleviate Arab pressure on
American companies to advance the Arab boycott of Israel. 2° Determining that American Jews as well as Israelis were the intended beneficiaries, 2 5 and that such discrimination was the type of harm sought to be
prevented by the EAA, the court prematurely ended its search, concluding that private actions were consistent with the aims of the legislation
199 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
200 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
201 The need to look at collateral factors was recognized in Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 423 (3d
Cir. 1974) and also in AmIrack, where a finding that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the
Amtrack Act and the harm was the type the law sought to prevent, was outweighed by the overriding goal of facilitating a more efficient passenger railroad service. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 461-64 (1974).
202 Comment, supra note 190, at 1426.
203 See Note, supra note 1, at 378-79.
204 Abramns, 581 F. Supp. at 1581.
205 Id.
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and, therefore, that such actions should be implied.2 °6 The court should
have gone on to examine the impact of any collateral considerations on
the question of implication.
Collateral issues involved in the passage of the EAA include the
concern that United States foreign policy was being shaped by American
businesses succumbing to foreign economic pressures, 20 7 and a desire to
minimize the loss of domestic jobs resulting from the operation of the
antiboycott provisions. 2°8 Both of these factors tend to counteract the
conclusion that private actions should be implied. Considerations in the
enforcement area serve to reinforce the conclusion that while Abrams
more closely approximated the correct method of implication analysis,
the Bulk Oil result is the correct one. Due to the business nature of
EAA-regulated activities and the complying companies' fear that noncomplying companies would gain a competitive edge, enforcement must
be consistent and uniform for the law to work. 20 9 This result is best
achieved through the centralized control and discretionary enforcement
that results from exclusive administrative remedies.
The conclusion that the purposes of the EAA are best served by
exclusively government-enforced remedies is not barred by the presence
of section 11 (g) of the Act. Bulk argued that section 11 (g) of the EAA
eliminated any doubt that Congress intended to make private actions
available under the statute. While the language on its face may suggest
this conclusion, it does not compel it. As the district court in Bulk Oil
noted, the legislative history of the civil penalty sections, of which subsection (g) is a part, analyzed it solely in terms of increased regulatory

flexibility.210 From this premise, the court concluded that subsection (g)

"confirms that the presence of civil penalties in subsections (c),(d), or (f)
in no way limited the government's choice of sanctions or actions to enforce the Act," 2" but that subsection (g) did not create an entirely new
remedy.
The legislative history of the EAA contains sufficient evidence to
suggest that section 11 (g) was included in order to maintain the government's remedial flexibility, not to throw open the statute to any type of
206 Id.
207 Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearingsand Markup Bcbre the House

Comm. on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
208 123 CONG. Ritc. 11,426 (1977) (statement of Mr. Michel).
209 See 123 CONG. Ric. 11,426 (1977) (statement of Mr. Solarz).
210 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1141-42. See Continuationof Authority for Regulation of Exports:
HearingsBefore the Comm.on Banking & Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965); H.R. Rin'. No.
434, 89th Cong., IstSess. (1965).
211 Bulk Oil, 583 F. Supp. at 1141-42 (emphasis in original).
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remedy imaginable. All of these aspects of the legislative purpose, which
both the Abrams and Bulk Oil decisions overlook, appear to be inconsistent with the implication of private rights.
The third Cort factor, whether a private remedy is consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme, involves an examination of the whole act, not just the remedies and enforcement sections.2 1 2
In determining what purposes the act was intended to serve, it is best to
begin with the language of the statute itself.2 13
Incorporated into the EAA is a declaration of policy which sets out
the purpose of the Act in general terms.21 4 This policy statement recognizes that the Arab boycott of Israel has effects on several different levels,
and indicates that this legislation was intended to combat the impact of
only some of them. The core of the Arab states' policy is their refusal to
conduct economic relations with Israel. This "primary" boycott, in effect since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, is recognized as a
legitimate form of economic warfare and lies beyond the scope of these
provisions. 2 15 The second manifestation of Arab policy is the "secondary" boycott where Arab nations attempt to interfere with the economic
relationship between third party countries, such as the United States, and
Israel. This is accomplished through the requirement that in order to do
business with Arab firms, United States companies must refuse to do
business with Israel. The last level is the "tertiary" boycott in which one
United States company is required not to do business with another
United States firm who continues to deal with Israel or employ Jews.
The latter two practices "impinge on U.S. domestic policy ' 2 16 and it is
the effects of these boycotts that the EAA amendments sought to
eradicate.21 7
According to a Senate report, the bill was designed to "prevent most
forms of compliance with foreign boycotts . . . and otherwise to
strengthen U.S. law against foreign boycotts and reduce their economic
impact."2 8 The less than absolute prohibition refers to a compromise in
the legislation which enumerates the exceptional circumstances where
compliance is permitted.21 9
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Comment, supra note 190, at 1421.
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2402. For the text of the statement, see supra note 17.
123 CONG. REC. at 11,422 (1977) (statement of Mr. Bingham).
Id. at 11,420 (statement of Mr. Whalen).
S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1977).
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(2)(A)-(F). For a summary of these exceptions, see S. REP. No. 104,

95th Cong., 1st Seas. 22-27 (1977).
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From the tenor of its discussions which emphasized the repugnant
character of foreign imposed discriminatory practices, it is clear that, exceptions aside, Congress sought "vigorous enforcement" of the antiboycott provisions.220 Discussion on the floor of the House as well as
the Senate emphasized the central importance of the antiboycott provisions as a mechanism for deterring potential violators from disregarding
fundamental American ideals in favor of business advantage.2 2 1
Congress amended the EAA in 1965 to include a statement of policy
against such United States compliance.2 22 Only the policy itself was incorporated into the law, however; enforcement was entirely dependent
on the efforts of the Department of Commerce to police and assure compliance with this instruction.22 3

Reports indicate that the agency dis-

played a "distressingly clear pattern of passivity to, promotion of and
disinterest in enforcing antiboycott policy .
,,22" Seeking to "assure
that this Nation would not compromise its basic values in the search for
expanded trade opportunities throughout the world,"2 '25 Congress recast

the statement of policy in terms of substantive statutory prohibitions carrying the force of law.2 2 6 In broad terms the statute seeks first, to end
Arab use of American business as a tool for their own foreign policy
objectives which are in conflict with our own, and second, to create a
2 27
statutory structure in which the substantive goals will be enforced.
Use of the antiboycott provisions primarily as a deterrent to prevent
potential violators from complying with Arab demands suggests an argument against judicial implication which is being raised with greater frequency at the present time.2 28 According to this argument, when
Congress enacted the antiboycott provisions, it selected the level of deterrence that, in its judgement, was the most appropriate for the activity
involved, in terms of both morality and efficiency. Congress' decision as
to how much deterrence is socially and economically optimal was embodied within the enforcement provisions of the act. When a court adds
220 S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977).
221 123 CONG. Ritc. 11,426 (1977) (statement of Mr. Solarz).
222 See supra note 27.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
224 S. RE;P. No. 104, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) quoting Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Report, "The Arab Boycott and American
Business," September 1977.
225 Id., reprinted in 123 CONG. Rtic. 11,430 (1977).
226 Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977).
227 See 123 CONc. Ric. 11,420 (1977) (statement of Mr. Whalen); id. at 11,424 (statement of Mr.
Fascell).
228 This argument was made in the securities context in Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and
Private Rights, 95 HARM. L. Ri.v. 1193, 1304 (1983).
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a private cause of action to that enforcement scheme, it is substituting its
own judgement for that of Congress, creating excessive deterrence from
Congress' point of view.22 9
While this approach is appealing at first in its fusion of separation of
powers and efficiency analysis, the argument assumes its own conclusion.
It is based on the assumption that Congress did not intend to create a
private action under the statute, because if Congress did in fact intend to
do so, then judicial implication of these fights would simply bring reality
into line with the legislated optimal level of deterrence. 230 Although this
analysis is helpful in determining the purposes of the statute on a general
level, attention to specific objectives is also necessary. On a more specific
level, the problem of multiplicity of goals and conflicting aims makes the
determination of statutory purpose more problematic.
In addition, it is not settled to what extent private fights of action
must be consistent with the statutory purposes to warrant implication.
When a statute seeks to achieve numerous, sometimes competing goals, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, for private actions to serve every one
of them. One commentator has noted that "[a]lthough the precedents
appear to indicate that inconsistency might be sufficient to deny a private
right, they do not make clear what degree of consistency would be enough
to confer one."'2 31 In Cannon, the Supreme Court found that implication
was justified because private rights were "fully consistent with-and in
some cases even necessary to-the orderly enforcement of the [Education
Amendments of 1972]. "232 Other courts have refused to imply private
actions when they are not "necessary to... or capable of furthering the
[statutory] purpose, '' 233 or not "completely consistent with the Act as a
234
whole.
These decisions indicate that something less than absolute necessity
is required before a court will imply a private right of action, yet the
standard that must be met is not clear. In line with this, most commentators including this author, take the position that even though a private
right of action might conflict with some of these statutory goals, it should
still be implied if those purposes are insignificant compared to the central
purposes of the act which such a remedy would facilitate.23 5
229 Id.
230 For different theories of judicial power underlying the implication of private remedies, see

Frankel, supra note 99.
231 Note, supra note 162, at 1387 n.54 (emphasis added).
2.32 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 706.
233 Securities Investor Protection v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1974).
234 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. at 461.
235 Note, supra note 1, at 390.
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In the case of the EAA, the background of congressional debate,
legislative hearings and reports reveals a spectrum of goals sought to be
achieved by this legislation. Most broadly, Congress intended to end
United States corporate compliance with the Arab boycott.2 3 6 The desire
to assert United States foreign policy independent of unwanted influence
from foreign nations such as the Arab states played a central role.2 3 7 At
the same time, members of Congress were concerned that this be
achieved with a minimum loss of jobs in this country.238
On one hand, the goal of freeing United States foreign policy from
unwanted foreign influence seems to favor the implication of private
rights. Individual suits tend to ensure that a larger percentage of violations are prosecuted than when the administration is solely responsible
for bringing lawsuits, due to the government's limited funds and other
resources.
On the other hand, the emphasis on harms to foreign policy rather
than the personal injuries suffered implies a greater concern for the foreign policy effects of this practice, a sphere placed exclusively in the
hands of the government, not the private citizen. Additionally, the
strong interest in preserving jobs in this country indicates that Congress
might not have wanted each and every violation to be punished, but instead to use the government's resources selectively to enforce the law to
its best advantage.2 3 9 In other words, concern for limiting the number of
jobs lost as a result of the operation of this statute shows that the level of
deterrence that Congress desired falls below the level which results from
near total enforcement by private suit. Tied to the deterrence aspect was
a congressional desire for administrative discretion. 24 This discretion
would be severely limited under the Abrams view of the EAA, permitting
private rights of action.
The final consideration under Cort v. Ash is whether "the cause of
action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the states. ..."I"4This element has fallen into disuse since
courts have taken the position that consideration of legislative intent is
dispositive on the issue of implication. However, it nevertheless remains
an important issue to address briefly. The court in Bulk Oil did not discuss the federalism question at all, and the court in Abrams summarily
236 123 CONG. REC. 11,424 (1977) (remarks of Mr. Fascell); id. at 11,481 (remarks of Mr.
Drinan).
237 Hearings,supra note 207, at 196.
238 123 CONG. REC. 11,426 (1977) (statement of Mr. Michel).
239 Id. at 11,419, 11,426.
240 S.REi,. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977).

241 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
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concluded that there was "no state law... govern[ing] the type of cause
which would be implied from the EAA." 42
Once again it is best to start with the language of the statute itself.
Section 2407(c) of the EAA states that the antiboycott provisions preempt any state law which regulates the subject."zg Although this plainly
expresses the intent to control the problem of Arab boycott pressures
solely within the federal forum, it does not settle the question of whether
these federal rights were to be exclusively administrative or to be extended to the private individual as well. Congress could have carried the
state preemption one step further by asserting the exclusivity of the
EAA, which would preclude the implication of private rights, yet it did
not do so.
The subject matter regulated by the antiboycott provisions of the
EAA suggests that the boycott-related issues which were removed from
the reach of state courts and legislatures should not be given out in new
form under the guise of private rights of action. Foreign affairs and foreign policy are areas of particular sensitivity which demand centralized
operation and command to assure their effectiveness. Because these issues are national in scope and derive their effectiveness from the singularity and clarity of the message that the policies convey to foreign
countries, the policy must be uniform across all states and it must be
consistently applied. Regional enforcement of the foreign policy objectives embodied in the antiboycott legislation would only serve to frustrate
the purpose of presenting a coherent and consistent stance on foreign
boycotts to nations with whom we trade. As a result of the heightened
need for uniformity and centralization involved in the operation of foreign affairs, this area of law is one traditionally left to federal
jurisdiction.2 44
Not only is foreign policy a federal concern, but it is also generally
viewed as primarily a matter for executive control. 245 In Bulk Oil, Sun
characterized the antiboycott provisions as "a grant of authority to the
EnPresident to conduct the foreign policy of the United States ....
that
of
judgement
matters
involves
forcement of the Act thus necessarily
can affect the foreign policy of the United States. '246 While this may be
true, the fact that a statute has international ramifications should not
242 Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1581.
243 Comment, supra note 190, at 1413-14.
244 See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).

245 United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936).
246 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, 1 35, Bulk Oil v. Sun, 583 F. Supp. 1134
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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automatically stand as a bar to private suits. Both the international and
domestic aspects of the legislation should be weighed.
Characterization of the EAA strictly as a regulation of foreign policy oversimplifies its purposes and effects. Although the general subject
of foreign boycotts relates closely to foreign affairs, it is specifically the
domestic impact of secondary and tertiary boycotts that the antiboycott
sections attempt to limit. The prohibitions run to any "United States
person" engaged in foreign or interstate commerce of the United
States.2 47 The prohibited behavior is particular domestic reactions to foreign actions, not the foreign actions themselves.2 4 8 In fact, though the
domestic and international facets of the law are tightly interwoven, the
subject matter of section 2407 focuses on the regulation of American
business operations which is more domestic than foreign.
Here, even though the regulation relates to both domestic and international affairs, the case for strict administrative exclusivity is stronger
than in questions of purely domestic law which comprise nearly all of the
implied private action cases heard by the Supreme Court to date. 24 9 On
this basis, the EAA may be distinguished from laws such as the Commodities Exchange Act, Securities Exchange Act and Title IX, which
have been considered on the question of implied private rights.2 50 The
EAA presents a stronger case against implication in this regard.
Aside from the foreign policy implications, the nature of the practices which the EAA seeks to regulate dictates that in order for the antiboycott provisions to work, they must affect all American businesses
equally. It appears that United States companies feared that refusing to
comply with the Arab demands would put them at a competitive disadvantage in relation to other firms who went along with the boycott and
received Arab contracts as a result. This concern was discussed during
the congressional debates in the House of Representatives.
American firms desiring to do business with the Arab states are presently faced with the unpleasant choice of succumbing to discriminatory de247 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1982).
248 122 CONG. REc. 31,930-31 (1976) (statement of Mr. Burke); 123 CONG. REC. 11,422 (1977)
(statement of Mr. Bingham); id. at 11,420 (statement of Mr. Whalen).
249 A representative sample of the implied rights cases that have come before the Supreme Court
in recent years includes: Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984) (denying private rights
under the Investment Company Act); Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (denying private right to sue for contribution among coconspirators
in an antitrust violation under the Sherman and Clayton Acts); University Research Ass'n, Inc. v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1980) (denying a private right of action under the Davis-Bacon Act regulating
government construction contracts).
250 Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1980), affd sub non., Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353 (1982); Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
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mands or suffering a loss of business to other American companies. A

uniform ban on compliance with boycott demands would end this dilemma
and place all firms on equal competitive footing ... 251
Uniform enforcement of the law can mean several things, however. It can
mean that the maximum number of suits are brought to court, or that
once instituted, these suits are resolved in a consistent manner according
to clear standards. Allowing private suits may result in the prosecution
of a greater number of cases,25 2 but an exclusive administrative remedy is
more likely to establish a clear cohesive standard of permissible and impermissible conduct due to coordination and centralization of control.
At bottom, the issue of implication presents a choice between these two
alternative types of "consistent" enforcement.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Review of recent implication cases has revealed that this area of law
is in a state of confusion. The conflicting outcomes in Bulk Oil and
Abrams reinforce the suspicion that this confusion is a result of judicial
opinions decided on the basis of visceral reactions rather than sound legal
doctrine. While extensive use of legislative history and strong presumptions in support of the outcomes tends to mask this fact, the use of the
same legislative evidence to arrive at opposite conclusions, as happened
in the two principal cases here, indicates that there must be some other
underlying grounds for decision which the presumption and legislative
history are used to justify. The opinions in Abrams and Bulk Oil can be
reconciled, but not on any basis contained within either opinion.
In order to rationalize the approach and assure some predictability
and consistency in the implication of private rights, a court's determination of whether implication of private rights is appropriate under a federal statute should be a multilevel evaluation. First, a court should
examine not only the legislative history of the statute, but also the language and structure of both the substantive and enforcement provisions
of the act, to ascertain whether clear and substantial evidence of congressional intent to create or deny a private right of action exists. In order to
satisfy the clear and substantial standard, the record must reflect direct
consideration of the issue of private rights, by either the drafting committee or the entire Congress in floor debate of the bill. Discussion of peripheral questions, such as the exclusivity of the federal law, are
insufficient, as is consideration of private rights by an unimportant or
small number of individuals within the legislative process.
251 123 CON;. Risc. at 11,431, (1977) (statement of Mr. Drinan) (emphasis added).
252 See Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
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Few statutes will meet the standard set out above. But in light of
the rationale behind the implication doctrine, namely the protection of
statutory interests as Congress envisioned them, it is a necessary threshold inquiry for a court to make. For those statutes that do meet this
standard, a clear and substantial showing of congressional intent brings
the judicial inquiry to an end.
In the majority of cases, however, a court should continue its inquiry beyond the specific intention to create or deny private rights, to a
more encompassing examination of statutory purpose. At this stage, a
court should look broadly at the substantive and enforcement goals that
Congress sought to achieve in passing this legislation.
Lauren B. Bonfield

